

Historical Materialism Book Series

Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism

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preceded them went into crisis, they took recognisable form only gradually and unevenly. I mentioned earlier Althusser's critique of an 'expressive' use of the category of totality, in which formations at every level correspond neatly to one another. Reality does not work like that. In general, a particular regime of accumulation, above all at the levels of economic production and gendered social reproduction, creates the conditions for the corresponding racial and sexual formations, but this does not mean that the corresponding formations immediately or necessarily come into existence.

So, for example, homosexuality became widely visible as such in Western Europe only in the 1890s with Oscar Wilde's trial in England and the founding of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in Germany, although it had roots in the depression that began in the 1870s and European imperial expansion from the 1880s. Lesbian/gay communities became widely visible in North and Latin America and Western Europe only in the late 1960s, although they had roots in a systemic crisis that began in the 1930s and social transformations that came with and after the Second World War. And although the clearest marker of today's gay normality, same-sex marriage, is a twenty-first-century phenomenon, its roots are in the recessive long wave that began in the 1970s and the spread of neoliberalism from the early 1980s.

Nor does the emergence of a new regime of accumulation in one part of the world necessarily imply that it will become dominant in other regions quickly, or ever. Even when an accumulation regime is dominant almost everywhere, as neoliberalism is now, it can still incorporate other capitalist accumulation regimes or even non-capitalist elements into its functioning, with a myriad of possible consequences at different levels of different social formations.

With all these caveats, the correspondence between regimes of accumulation and same-sex formations provides evidence for a basic historical materialist assertion: the material relations of production and reproduction constitute the fundamental matrix underlying all of social reality. It also has political implications. In the political introduction, I argued that especially in a period like this one, anti-capitalists cannot afford to neglect sexual and racial identity politics, because particularly when progressive class-based movements are weak, what are called the 'culture wars' in the US are often the wellspring of politics. This is vital in day-to-day and year-to-year struggles. But if economic long waves are ultimately determinant for the shift from one same-sex formation to another, then on a scale of decades and centuries sexual radicals cannot afford to neglect the dynamics of capitalist economies. In other words, consistent queer opponents of homonormativity have to be at least anti-neoliberal if not anti-capitalist.

The analysis of same-sex formations has other political implications as well. Negatively, it means that the mutations from invert-dominant to gay-dominant to homonormative-dominant regimes have marked a steadily if unevenly increasing ghettoisation of same-sex desire. Despite growing tolerance of LGBT people in many countries, even despite some straight-identified people's willingness to acknowledge their own same-sex desires, the development of family structures and sexual ideologies has, if anything, solidified the boundaries between straight and LGBT people. Positively, each same-sex regime has generated forms of rebellion and resistance. In the era of classical imperialism, there are examples from Suriname to Morocco and beyond of people who persisted in same-sex relationships that failed to fit the category of 'homosexuality', while allied sex reform and Communist movements offered political prospects to pathologised inverts. In the Fordist era, the radicalisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s included lesbian/gay liberationists' rebellion, consciously linked to broader revolutionary currents, against the hardening binary. And today, in the age of gay normality, LGBT people whose lives adapt them poorly to neoliberalism have increasingly been defining *their* identities in non-homonormative ways: queer ways.

Combined and Uneven Social Construction

In addition to the difficulty of providing an analysis of same-sex sexualities under capitalism that does justice to temporal and social continuities and discontinuities, I face the difficulty of providing an analysis that at least approximates being global. While a genuinely global analysis is more than I can manage, I do attempt to include evidence from enough regions to avoid the pitfalls of focusing exclusively on either the world's richest regions or those whose cultures are largely derived from Europe (the two factors that are usually combined to form the ideological construct of 'the West'). I have tried to make the realities of the dependent world in particular an integral part of the account.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ The unevenness of LGBT studies reflects more than global disparities of wealth and power. This book relies to South Africa and Thailand more than contemporary Italy, for example – not because Italy is poor or dependent, or for that matter because it has no LGBT life, but because of cultural and historical factors that have held back the growth of LGBT studies there. It also inevitably reflects the hegemony of the US in queer studies worldwide, even in the study of LGBT people elsewhere – itself a historical phenomenon

There is a strong tendency to tell the history of homosexuality as 'a progressive, even teleological, evolution from pre-modern repression, silence, and invisibility to modern visibility and sexual freedom'.⁸⁰ Besides being a simplistic and in many ways false narrative of progress, the dominant account of LGBT people in the world today is Eurocentric. Insofar as it does not define LGBT identities as eternal and unchanging, the dominant account portrays them as 'Western' discoveries, of which the rest of the world is now reaping the benefits. It either establishes a distinction between the 'modern' and the 'pre-modern' that functions as a strategy of exclusion, or perpetuates the 'hoary colonialist notion that non-European cultures represent the cultural childhood of modern Europe', or implies a 'Eurocentric progress narrative' that at the very least fails to take enough account of messy transnational realities.⁸¹

However it does so, the dominant account generally credits 'the West' with pioneering the emancipation of LGBT people who have always been everywhere, living in fear and silence. Even queer theory has often been 'as relentlessly Atlantic-centric in its view of the world as the mainstream culture it critiques'.⁸² Whatever their variants, the Eurocentric narratives of queer studies make it almost impossible to grasp and appreciate, for example, the 'variety, distribution, and longevity of same-sex patterns in Islamic societies'.⁸³ It is all too easy to reduce sexual lives in the poorer four-fifths of the world to a 'false "other"' and thereby 'erase the complexities and inconsistencies of an overarching model'.⁸⁴

Many historians realise that this picture is a distortion. But this does not eliminate the mind-set that perpetuates it, whether explicitly or, more often and effectively, implicitly. The way to avoid these pitfalls is not to deny difference, or to recognise difference in a way that denies different sexual regimes' parallels, interactions and development from one to another. It is true that earlier sexual forms persist, and that no single pattern is ever wholly dominant. But this does not mean that all historical models are operative 'at every historical moment'; that specific models are never hegemonic, or that one model's

that reflects more than the exceptional size and wealth of us universities, as I discuss in chapters 2 and 3.

⁸⁰ Roscoe and Murray 1997, pp. 4–6.

⁸¹ Halperin 2002, pp. 18–20, 13–14.

⁸² Altman 2000, p. 138.

⁸³ Roscoe and Murray 1997, pp. 4–6.

⁸⁴ Green 1999a, p. 8.

dominance cannot have a decisive impact on how the others function. To deny this would be to impose 'a new and more insidious universalism'.⁸⁵

The truth is that LGBT communities and identities are part of a global reality, but in a far more complex and contradictory way than the radiation from centre to periphery of a newfound way of life, or of the pioneering emancipation of an age-old way of life. The Marxist concept of 'combined and uneven development', which describes the ways in which high-tech and older technologies and systems of production can co-exist in economically dominated countries, suggests a way forward.

In the past, I have used the term 'combined and uneven social construction' to describe processes, linked today to neoliberal globalisation, that are constantly generating worldwide sexual difference. This term has a significant advantage in that it avoids any implication of a uniform process moving more or less quickly in a single direction, which the idea of 'globalisation' seems to suggest. The idea of combined and uneven social construction, by contrast, can help us understand how different indigenous starting points, different relationships to the world economy, and different cultural and political contexts can combine to produce very different results – while still producing identifiable common elements of LGBT identities in one country after another. It can help us understand how some indigenous sexual patterns can be preserved within a global economy and culture, changing to a certain extent their forms or functions; how new forms can emerge; and how indigenous and new forms can be combined.⁸⁶

The initial definition of 'homosexuality' in capitalist societies, which was the identification and treatment of a pathology, was embedded in the global expansion of a gendered and sexualised capitalism, which identified many non-capitalist societies as hotbeds of homosexuality. In fact, pre-colonial and pre-capitalist sexual cultures had extraordinarily rich and varied forms of same-sex eroticism, in some cases expressed in open, socially accepted forms of same-sex behaviour or identity in historical periods when 'sodomites' were still being burned alive in Europe. With the arrival of colonialism and capitalism, this discovery was used to legitimate conquest and to map out a programme for transforming the conquered societies in ways that fit the imperatives of capital.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Halperin 2002, pp. 12, 21.

⁸⁶ For an initial attempt to apply the idea of combined and uneven development to same-sex sexual formations, see Drucker 1996.

⁸⁷ Bleys 1995.

Later, in imperialist countries after the Second World War, geographical displacement, rising wages, the development of a welfare state and legal victories redefined the heterosexual norm from a strict taboo on 'the love that dare not speak its name' to a situation where LGBT people are considered 'abnormal' more in a statistical than in a pathological sense – and in the sense that they are still more or less marginal to the family institutions through which society reproduces itself. However, this process of redefining the heterosexual norm was not uniformly replicated in economically dominated countries. Varied indigenous sexual cultures combined with different modes of insertion into the world market to produce widely divergent heterosexual norms and widely variant LGBT formations.

Thailand, a country that was fully incorporated into the world capitalist market without ever being formally colonised, is a particularly striking case of the impact of capitalism on sexual developments in a distinctive social formation, independently of European or North American cultural influence. Peter Jackson has argued cogently in his work on Thailand that LGBT formations in dependent countries have not always emerged from a single, foreign capitalism, but through 'hybridizations' derived equally from 'local capitalisms that have revolutionized local premodern cultures', as capitalism 'produces novel cultural forms again and again in each society in which it takes root'.⁸⁸ What same-sex patterns emerge in a particular society is 'not a foregone conclusion'; it involves 'unexpected outcomes'.⁸⁹

As I have argued elsewhere, these outcomes can be sorted into several broad patterns, including the suppression of indigenous same-sex eroticism by colonialism, its adaptation to better fit the requirements of dependent capitalist development, its repression by neo-colonial regimes, and the relative greater prominence of transgender patterns in conditions of dependent development.⁹⁰ This means that no LGBT identity today can be *purely* indigenous. In a global capitalist system with far-reaching social and cultural consequences, the idea of absolutely pure, authentic same-sex identities is as untenable as a false universalism.⁹¹

Of the different factors at work in combined and uneven social construction – indigenous sexual regimes, economic and social development, cultural

globalisation and political change – I have argued that cultural globalisation and the rise of the 'global gay'⁹² may be the least essential. Cultural borrowings are frequent, of course – cultural industries are part of the broader political economy⁹³ – but they are no proof of influence, let alone causation. Deep-going social processes like urbanisation are far more central to identity formation than access to European magazines and Hollywood movies.⁹⁴ A materialist analysis would even suggest that the poor countries' economic dependence, by helping to hold back and distort economic growth, has delayed the emergence of a specifically lesbian/gay identity.

Thanks to mass migration, moreover, the peoples of these different parts of the world increasingly live side by side, mostly in the imperialist countries; another crucial factor in shaping sexual regimes. The role of capital and of capitalist states in structuring migratory flows needs to be integrated into a transnational understanding of sexuality.⁹⁵ This applies to both international migration and the movement from countryside to cities characteristic of sexual dissidents worldwide, in the course of which 'the purportedly premodern and the seemingly postmodern... intersect'.⁹⁶ For international migrants, migration involves, alongside the economic, social and cultural impact of their destination country on the countries left behind, a process in which the diaspora 'creates the homeland' – a fact equally relevant to queer diasporas.⁹⁷

So far, LGBT studies has not managed to define its field of study in a way that does justice to all these different global parameters. At first, it almost exclusively studied North America and Europe. In more recent decades, as part of what is called 'the transnational turn', the study of same-sex formations in Latin America, Africa and Asia has flourished, but in ways that usually either borrow basic categories from earlier, Eurocentric works, or that look at their regions in relative isolation. In this book, I attempt to begin from an insight that, as far as I am aware, has not yet been treated as central to the study of LGBT regimes: that their development has always been a global process, but one in which, at every stage, *both* the rich, dominant, imperialist countries *and* the poor, dominated, economically dependent countries were central to these regimes' transformations.

⁸⁸ Jackson 1989, pp. 387–364.

⁸⁹ Roloff 1993, p. 470.

⁹⁰ I have developed this analysis at greater length elsewhere (Drucker 2009, pp. 15–16, 29–5).

⁹¹ Neil Garcia has argued convincingly against the idea that 'cultures are by nature circumscribed by impermeable boundaries' (1996, pp. xvi–xviii).

⁹² Altman 1996, pp. 77–8.

⁹³ Duggan 2003, p. 78.

⁹⁴ Adam, Duyvendak and Kronwel have pointed out that even similar cultural practices have quite different meanings in different cultures (1999, p. 348).

⁹⁵ Arguëlles and Rich 1989, pp. 442–450.

⁹⁶ Herzog 2011, p. 205.

⁹⁷ Puar 2007, pp. 179–2 (citing Brian Keith Axel and David Eng).

So while this book focuses on same-sex sexualities under neoliberal capitalism, in trying to give an adequate account I have been forced to give it a broad scope in both time and space. Making sense of LGBT sexualities today requires me to explain how they are both the same as and different from same-sex formations in non-capitalist societies, in capitalist societies in which same-sex formations were not 'gay', and in the capitalist societies of the 1960s and 1970s in which these sexualities were 'gay' in a somewhat different sense. Making sense of LGBT formations in any one part of the world today requires me to explain how virtually every part of today's world is linked to the rest, economically, socially and sexually, in a hierarchy that is characterised by often brutal domination and inequality, whose globalisation is as productive of difference as it is of homogenisation.

An emphasis on combined and uneven social construction is in tension with an account of a same-sex formation as a global totality. The same-sex regime that is globally dominant – today, I argue, neoliberal homonormativity – is by no means locally dominant in every corner of the planet. Even within a single country – South Africa, for instance – the same-sex regime in a predominantly white, middle-class gay disco in Cape Town is very different from the regime two women in a relationship face in Soweto or in rural KwaZulu. I believe that both the global and the local are relevant to sexual politics in each situation, in ways I will try to show, but what is politically decisive varies in different times and places.

These methodological parameters have implications for the organisation of Part 1 of this book. At first glance, the sequence of chapters and sections is chronological: first pre-capitalist societies (prologue), then pre-gay same-sex formations in capitalist societies (prologue and chapter 1), then lesbian/gay sexualities under Fordist capitalism (chapter 2), then LGBT sexualities under neoliberalism today (chapter 3). In fact, since capitalism and its different regimes of accumulation prevailed in different parts of the world at different times, examples from chronologically earlier periods sometimes appear later than examples from chronologically later periods. Moreover, since capitalist regimes of accumulation have sometimes allowed or even compelled the preservation of non-capitalist or differently-capitalist elements within an overarching global order, even the chapter on sexualities under neoliberalism has to discuss phenomena that at first sight 'fit' into earlier periods. I do my best to make clear as I go along why and how the different pieces of the jigsaw belong where they are placed.

As Theo van der Meer has pointed out, there is no such single entity as homosexuality, and the homosexuality of a hundred years ago is not the

homosexuality of today.⁹⁸ Moreover, there is *still* no single same-sex sexual pattern today. The same-sex sexuality of a Dutch gay professional man is far removed from that of an Indonesian tomboy – whether she lives in Jakarta or in Amsterdam. And neither of them is more modern than the other; neither represents the end of the story. The story is still unfolding.

⁹⁸ Van der Meer 2007, p. 19.

promote female bonding. This female bonding, including sexual activity, has the potential in male-dominated societies to be felt or seen as a form of women's resistance, 'both the breaking of a taboo and the rejection of a compulsory way of life'.³⁰

Transgender remained an especially strong tradition in South and Southeast Asia, perhaps because Hinduism preserved elements of earlier, kinship-based cultures even after the rise of centralised states. Indian cultural traditions were tolerant towards androgyny, as is evident from the androgynous character of major Hindu deities such as Siva, Vishnu and Krishna,³¹ and spread with Hinduism as far as Bali.³² The transition to class society in South Asia probably helped to bring about the severe restriction of women's public life now characteristic of Hinduism, and also probably lowered the status of male-to-female trans people.

In any event, the rise of class society required fitting trans people into a more elaborate division of labour and a more developed hierarchy. In some cases, the existence of people located outside rigid kinship structures could have advantages from the viewpoint of a wider class society. This seems to have been the case with the South Asian transgendered *hijras*. *Hijras* were traditionally drawn from the ranks of those who were seen as unqualified for male or female status, family formation and thus full personhood: intersex people, eunuchs (either from birth or emasculated by other *hijras*; those living as *hijras* but resisting emasculation faced disapproval and pressure), sexually impotent males, or women unable to menstruate. Living together in groups under the direction of a *hijra guru* and with no caste and kinship status to uphold, *hijras* were freed from the constraints of respectable behavior and nearly invulnerable to social control by those outside their community.³³

In religious terms, *hijras* consciously accepted outsider status made them 'ascetics' or 'renouncers', able to 'transform an incomplete personhood into a transcendent one' and 'the dross of lost virility into the gold of divine power'.³⁴ They were supposed to be under the protection of the goddess Bahuchara Mata and to be endowed with her powers, including the power to bless or curse.³⁵ Economically, they functioned as paid performers at weddings and

births (traditionally of boys) – thus ensuring the persistence of a male lineage from which they were excluded – and to some extent as prostitutes.³⁶

Strikingly, a somewhat similar transgender social role existed for Byzantine eunuchs, despite their embedding in the different ideological framework of Christianity. Over a period of almost a thousand years, eunuchs were defined broadly as not only men who had been castrated but all men who could not procreate and were thus marginalised from kinship structures. This made them ineligible for supreme power but all the more suited for a wide range of social roles, as brokers, secretaries, envoys, singers, doctors, political advisers and administrators. Church spokesmen defended and even exalted the institution of eunuchs, responding to the argument that castration was unnatural by asserting that 'ascetics choose a life beyond nature'.³⁷

A related tradition existed in Thailand. The Thai word *kathoe*, which primarily means intersex, has also been used to describe transvestites and other men who take on feminine roles. Despite the existence of Buddhist texts viewing transvestism and male prostitution as sinful,³⁸ Thai Buddhist ethical literature contained only one prohibition relative to *kathoys*, interestingly enough: the prohibition of magic transforming a *kathoe* into a man or vice versa. Thai traditions, which allowed married men to keep concubines and visit prostitutes, permitted *kathoys* to fill these roles as well.³⁹

Societies in the Americas with large concentrations of African slaves often made possible the persistence of African transgender patterns among the enslaved. Perhaps gender relations among slaves – in which enslaved women as well as men did heavy labour, men had little or no power as heads of households, and a 'dual marriage structure' gave white owners as well as black male slaves sexual access to female slaves – allowed both genders 'expressive and "mothering"' behaviour and gave women scope to be sexual.⁴⁰

Class Trumps Kinship

In many Eurasian slave-based economies, however, in which slaves were torn from their kinship and community ties, age-defined or class-defined sexual relationships between males were common and often dominant in their

³⁰ Rich 1983, pp. 183–97.

³¹ Nanda 1994, pp. 375–6.

³² Augustine et al. 2012, p. 306.

³³ Nanda 1994, pp. 380–5, 392.

³⁴ Nanda 1994, pp. 394–5.

³⁵ Nanda 1994, pp. 373, 386–7; Kumar 1993, pp. 86–90.

³⁶ Drucker 1996, p. 80.

³⁷ Kingrose 1994, pp. 85–6, 90, 96–7, 106.

³⁸ Hinsch 1990, pp. 96–7.

³⁹ Jackson 1989, pp. 20, 26, 37.

⁴⁰ Weicker 2006, pp. 161, 106–7.

same-sex formations. In these cultures, males who were sexually penetrated were supposed to be socially inferior to, or at least younger than, the men who penetrated them. This was the hegemonic same-sex pattern in the countries of Greek or Latin culture along the Mediterranean, the Persian-Arab-Islamic world and the Chinese empire.⁴¹

The ancient Greeks, for example, defined sex as penetration, and penetration as domination. The 'proper targets' of desire for an adult male citizen, who in principle was also the head of a patriarchal household, were women, youths, foreigners and slaves. Male citizens in ancient Athens were distinguished from slaves and foreigners by freedom 'from servility, exemption from torture, and corporeal inviolability' – including, at least as adults, freedom from sexual penetration. They were also distinguished by their equal right to penetrate, to the point that Solon reputedly established public brothels open to all citizens as one of the founding acts of Athenian democracy.⁴²

In this respect as in others, the Arab caliphate was the heir to the Mediterranean social order of the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as the Persian Empire it had conquered. Despite explicit condemnations of *liwat* (sodomy) in the Koran, men's desire for male youths pervaded much of medieval Arabic love poetry and classical literature. The Koran, later Islamic religious texts and medieval Arabic love poetry confirm that Arabs in the first centuries of Islam simply did not classify human beings as homosexual or heterosexual.⁴³ Arabic did not even have a word for 'the sort of bisexuality that was considered as the unmarked, most common form of sexual practice'.⁴⁴ Instead, references to male-male sexual relations in medieval Arabic sources fell into an age-defined pattern: when the beloved was not a youth between 15 and 20 years old, he was almost always a slave, an artisan, a labourer or transgendered.⁴⁵

Intergenerational patterns were equally hegemonic in the same-sex formation of medieval Iran, where lust for male youths was seen as such an intrinsic part of adult male desire that an eleventh-century advice manual urged

41 Greenberg 1988, pp. 91, 164.

42 Halperin 1990, pp. 30, 96, 100. The ancient Greeks' ephebophilia (male desire for pubescent youths) was distinctive in the emphasis they placed (at least in Athens and a number of other city-states, and only among citizens) on the educational function of an older lover's passion for his young beloved. Foucault stressed the 'admiration, gratitude, or affection' that youths were supposed to feel for their ancient Greek lovers (1960, p. 223), though he questioned whether the Greeks' privileging of ephebophilia was due solely to 'pedagogical concerns' (p. 195).

43 Massad 2007.

44 Amer 2005, p. 224.

45 Peirce 2000, p. 1333.

marriage mainly as a way of safeguarding a man's religion against homoerotic impulses. As in ancient Greece, the age when facial hair was just beginning to sprout was seen in Iran as particularly desirable, while the growth of a full beard marked the transition from being the object to the subject of desire.⁴⁶ This kind of intergenerational homoeroticism apparently spread with Arab-Persian-Islamic culture, for example, into Turkey, Albania, Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, where classical Urdu poets celebrated it.⁴⁷ Evidence from Central Asian regions under imperial Chinese rule suggests that the tradition of Sogdian dancing boys dates to pre-Islamic times.⁴⁸ Same-sex traditions also persisted among the Muslim Swahili peoples of the East African coast.⁴⁹

In East Africa alone, interestingly, the higher status of women led to the adaptation of the Islamic male-male pattern to women.⁵⁰ In medieval Arab regions, by contrast, sex between women – generally conceived as 'rubbing' rather than penetration – was sometimes the subject of erotic tales, but often was not taken terribly seriously. 'Rubbing', which medical authorities said could be an 'innate and lifelong' predisposition for some women, was sometimes even viewed as a sort of insurance against adultery with men, which was seen as a far graver sin. Erotic practices between women like kissing and caressing were treated lightly, and not viewed as 'sodomy' (*liwat*). Medieval Arabic romances sometimes portrayed love between women as deep and passionate, but they almost invariably showed the women marrying men in the end – the women's own preferences being of no practical significance.⁵¹

The same-sex sexual regime of Ottoman society too was predominantly intergenerational, with a rich same-sex sexual life embedded in patriarchal mores. Intergenerational relationships cut across communal divides, with the formal supremacy of Islam allowing for much social and sexual interaction, including same-sex interaction, between Muslims, Christians and Jews.⁵² Ottoman Jews followed the same patterns as Muslims. Same-sex relations between women, while more difficult and less attested, were feared particularly among widows.⁵³

46 Najmabadi 2005, pp. 159, 15.

47 Drucker 1996, pp. 81–2.

48 Hirsch 1990, pp. 61–2.

49 Mburu 2000, p. 181.

50 Greenberg 1988, pp. 179–82.

51 Amer 2005, pp. 216–17, 22–3, 228.

52 Drucker 2012, pp. 143–5.

53 Peirce 2000, no. 1332–3 (citing Yaron Ben-Nach).

Imperial China too for millennia had a same-sex formation in which intergenerational relationships founded on status differences predominated.⁵⁴

A key feature of these intergenerational regimes was the lack of any permanent identity linked to same-sex object choice, particularly of the adult male who penetrated youths or younger or lower-status males. Privileged adult males saw themselves as entitled to satisfaction of their sexual desires as an integral part of their privilege, and the gender of their sexual objects as being of no great significance. Ancient Greek and Roman, classical Arab and Persian,⁵⁵ and imperial Chinese sources even identified individual adult men who were exclusive or strong partisans of either women or male youths as exceptional and even odd, since most adult men were assumed to be capable of being sexually aroused by both. Any preference they did have was generally ascribed to a liking 'for particular human body parts, independent of the sex of the person who possess[ed] them. The texts contained little or no suggestion that adult men would be desirable to any other adult men of comparable status;⁵⁶ among free, non-transgendered males, only youths were seen as objects of desire.⁵⁷

This regime had consequences both for the youths who were the objects of desire and for the possibilities of friendship and love between men. For the youths, sexual submission to privileged adult males did not involve assuming a specific identity and was not necessarily perceived as dishonourable, on two conditions: (1) that it never be motivated by a desire for penetration (as opposed to respect or affection); and (2) that it never happen once full adulthood was reached (unless it involved submission to someone as exalted as a Chinese emperor). For privileged adult men, their feelings for youths might include intense passion, but could not be identified with friendship (any more than desire for a woman could be), because friendship was only possible between equals. Sex was about penetration, and therefore superiority and inferiority: it was 'not the sort of thing you would do to someone you really love'.⁵⁸

Ottoman sexual culture too saw men's sexual drive as not only natural but in need of immediate satisfaction – within the parameters of patriarchal power relations.⁵⁹ Since marriage entailed the segregation of wives and was not founded on romantic love, privileged Ottoman men did not generally experience their extramarital liaisons as sources of conflict or pain. In ancient

imperial China too, since marriage was seen as 'the bonding of two lineage groups' rather than a romantic union, Chinese wives were expected to accept a husband's female concubine and, by the same token, his 'dalliances with a male slave'.⁶⁰

Nonetheless, powerful men's sexual preferences for youths could be seen, especially in times of societal crisis, as threatening to marriage or procreation, and accordingly could be regulated, restricted or banned. The Chinese ban on 'sodomy with consent' decreed in 1740 under the Qing dynasty was part of a general crackdown on the perceived licentiousness of the preceding Ming dynasty. After a period of initial severity, however, this provision was enforced only intermittently or not at all.⁶¹

One striking, recurrent pattern is the persistence and even prevalence of transgender relationships even in societies where some other same-sex pattern was hegemonic. We will see that this was the case in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe and North America, where the new, broad category of 'homosexuality' in fact largely overlapped with what was then called 'sexual inversion' and would now often be viewed as transgender relationships. A similar pattern seems to be re-emerging in the twenty-first century, where 'queer' often means 'gender queer'. Something similar took place in many ancient societies where intergenerational or status-defined same-sex formations were hegemonic, but coexisted with, subordinated and reshaped transgender patterns. This underscores that while class and other status differences constitute central structuring elements, gender always underlies them and remains crucial. Moreover, alongside other forms of resistance to unequal social relations, resistance to the gender roles and identities assigned to individuals seems to be a constant.

This was the case, for example, in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. In ancient Athens and other Greek city-states, while the idealised form of male same-sex relations was *ephebophilia* – desire, courtship and sex between an adult citizen and a pubescent citizen boy – adult male citizens could also sexually penetrate transgendered men called *kinaidai* (or in Rome, where the pattern was similar, *cinaedi*), whose desire to be penetrated revealed their gender deviance. The same applied to the female category of *tribades*, women whose desire to penetrate other women was only one aspect of their identification as 'phallic... hypermasculine or butch'.⁶²

⁵⁴ Hirsch 1990, pp. 20–2.

⁵⁵ Najmabadi 2005, p. 20.

⁵⁶ Halperin 2002, pp. 90, 97–8, 95.

⁵⁷ Halperin 1989, p. 44.

⁵⁸ Halperin 2002, pp. 145, 121.

⁵⁹ Thanks to Özlem Barin for this point.

⁶⁰ Hirsch 1990, pp. 19, 49.

⁶¹ Hirsch 1990, pp. 139–45, 162; Ng 1989, pp. 88–9.

⁶² Halperin 2002, pp. 33, 122 (citing Craig Williams), 37, 51.

Forms of transgender identity also existed in many Arab countries, where there have traditionally been terms for adult male-to-female trans people: *hassas* in Morocco, *köçek* in Turkey, *khanith* in Oman, *khusrā* in Pakistan, and so on.⁶³ As among the ancient Greeks, receptive sexual behaviour that was not terribly stigmatised among male youths (as long as it was discreet) became a marker of transgendered identity, and shameful, in an adult male.⁶⁴ Pre-colonial Indonesia also provides examples of complex combinations of intergenerational and transgender formations: along with transgendered *waria*, intergenerational relationships were common in western Sumatra and, as early as the eighteenth century, in Muslim boarding schools in central and eastern Java.⁶⁵

In imperial China, the intergenerational relationships between the scholar/gentry and boy actors could also have a transgender dimension, as the boy actors often played female roles on stage. Eunuchs, sometimes (though not always) stereotyped as effeminate, also took passive roles in sex with powerful adult men. One seventeenth-century tale described a younger male 'wife' devoted to her husband to the point of castrating herself to preserve her feminine features. Another seventeenth-century story generalised that 'a man can become a woman and a woman can become a man'.⁶⁶

Ancient Greece and Rome, Islamic empires and China all had highly developed commodity production and exchange, and accordingly prostitution, including male prostitution. Just as female prostitutes were viewed as inferior to married women because of their more precarious embedding in class hierarchies, however, male prostitutes clearly did not have the status of court favourites. In imperial China, acting and male prostitution were clearly linked to their mutual disadvantage; some Chinese male actors even had bound feet.⁶⁷

Feudalism

Feudalism fits into the broad category of societies in whose sexual regimes class and status trumped gender and kinship. Yet the feudal mode of production had distinctive features that help account for capitalism's emergence from

63 Roscoe and Murray 1997.

64 Peirce 2009, p. 1331 (citing Everett Rowson).

65 Oetomo and Fmond 1992, pp. 7, 3–4.

66 Hinsch 1990, pp. 148, 43–4, 12; Ng 1989, pp. 82, 84.

67 Hinsch 1990, pp. 72, 152–6.

feudalism in Europe and capitalism's failure to emerge in Asian empires that not only were far wealthier but also had far more extensive commodity production and exchange.⁶⁸ The fragmented nature of political power in feudal societies allowed quasi-bourgeois economic and social relations to flourish and achieve local dominance, even in urban enclaves that were physically and economically dwarfed by the surrounding feudal rural order, in a way that would have been impossible in more centralised states. This characteristic fragmentation had consequences for feudal sexual regimes as well. Beginning as early as fourteenth-century Italy, it made possible the emergence of urban same-sex regimes.

Feudal Japan, whose mode of production paralleled feudal Europe's in many ways, is an interesting case in point. It had a distinctive sexual regime in which intergenerational relationships between adult samurai and adolescents constituted the social ideal of male love.⁶⁹ Male-male sexual relations were intricately regulated in seventeenth- to mid-nineteenth-century Tokugawa Japan to maintain the hierarchy between samurai and their adolescent servants and acolytes.⁷⁰ Idealised devotion between samurai could make 'youth' a purely conventional term, however: although a youth traditionally became a man at about the age of 19 in a ceremony in which his forelocks were shaved, one story described two samurai who began their relationship as a 19-year-old man and a 16-year-old youth, but still preserved their roles as 'man' and 'youth' at the ages of 66 and 63.⁷¹

Sexual relationships between adult Buddhist monks and their adolescent novices shared many of the features of idealised samurai intergenerational relationships. Feudal Japan from the tenth to the nineteenth centuries had a tradition of tales of love between Buddhist monks and boy acolytes, with many love poems by monks included in imperial poetic anthologies.⁷²

In the course of these centuries, a commodified same-sex subculture also grew up in Japanese towns, involving relationships between adult male merchants and transgendered boy kabuki actors who prostituted themselves. Townsmen took over the practice of male love from the samurai and Buddhist elite, and developed relationships between merchants and boy kabuki actors playing female roles.⁷³ However, there was a clear sense that these class

68 Anderson 1973b, pp. 410–30.

69 Schalow 1996, pp. 14–16.

70 Loos 2001, p. 1321 (citing Gregory Pflugfelder).

71 Schalow 1989, pp. 120, 125–6.

72 Schalow 1996, p. 14.

73 Miller 1996, n. 90; Schalow 1986, n. 15.

There was a long colonial tradition of seeing Asia as the site of 'carefully suppressed animalistic, perverse, homo- and hyposexual instincts'.²²⁰ In Russia, a conservative critic described homosexuality in 1909 as once confined to the 'less-civilised' Arabs and Caucasian mountain tribes.²²¹ In Cuba too, one anthropologist in 1906 blamed the 'abominable vice' of homosexuality on Asian immigrants.²²²

The repression of same-sex regimes occurred even where European imperialism took semi-colonial forms rather than the form of direct conquest and rule. At least for privileged men, pre-nineteenth-century Greece under Ottoman rule, like the Ottoman lands as a whole, was sexually 'freer than liberated Greece was to be'.²²³ The Greek national state, established in the 1820s and consolidated over the course of the nineteenth century, would be religiously intolerant and sexually repressive, with the power of the Orthodox clergy acting as a brake on the development of an open homoerotic life. The current European ideological prism, which in general does no justice to the historical variety, distribution, and longevity of same-sex patterns in Islamic societies,²²⁴ makes no sense at all of the sexual repression that nationalism and Europeanisation brought to the former Ottoman Balkans.

If the process of homosexual identity formation was rocky and irregular in Europe and North America, it was many times more so in the dominated regions reshaped rapidly by imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On balance, the evidence tends to confirm Jurrod Hayes's conclusion: 'Whereas colonial discourses represent precolonial cultures as being more patriarchal than the colonizing one, colonisation in practice meant the imposition of a specifically European form of patriarchy; the nuclear family headed by men'.²²⁵ However, the binary of heterosexuality and homosexuality took different forms in the countries of dependent capitalism.

While middle-class men in the most urbanised areas of Latin America began moving towards more reciprocal homosexuality before the Second World War, as in North America and Western Europe, the invert-dominant model still prevailed in the early 1970s in Brazil's north and northeast, in rural areas and

among the urban poor. The Afro-Brazilian religion *candomblé* reinforced this pattern, with many of the *candomblé* priests being transgendered.²²⁶

Southeast Asian cases are particularly complex, as European influence over Southeast Asia began early but proceeded slowly, with the conquest of Indonesia and the Philippines being completed only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and Thailand never being formally colonised at all. Yet Thailand's incorporation into the world market began as early as the seventeenth century, although the transition from feudalism to capitalism proceeded slowly until the late nineteenth-century abolition of serfdom and beyond.²²⁷ From the 1850s, however, while semi-colonial Siam was subordinated to European imperialism, it retained political independence as it 'entered the imperial world economy ... as the "rice bowl" of Southeast Asia, exporting rice to European colonies like British Malaya and Dutch Java, in a process that actually reinforced the authority of Thai elites'.²²⁸

The impact of social change on Thai sexual culture was gradual. The Thai tradition of transgendered *kathoys* predated any contact with Europe.²²⁹ The abolition of slavery in the late nineteenth century, however, helped create the conditions for the domestic sex trade as a major local industry over a half century before the era of international sex tourism. By the 1930s, there was a same-sex sex trade in which teenage boys catered to Thai adult men, and prostitution by *kathoys* catering to non-transgendered adult male *seua bar* ('big-tigers'). By the early 1960s, nationally distributed newspapers were fostering the rapid dissemination of gay and *kathoy* identity' in Thailand.²³⁰ The spread of trans-vestite beauty contests, common in much of contemporary Latin America but presumably not a tradition of ancient Southeast Asia, was one indication of how the Thai *kathoy* pattern took on more commodified forms without losing its indigenous character.²³¹ In much of South and Southeast Asia, pre-colonial transgender relationships were incorporated into a domestic and global sexual market.²³²

²²⁶ Green 1999a, pp. 6–7 (citing Peter Frey and Ruth Landes).

²²⁷ Jackson 1989, p. 45.

²²⁸ Jackson 2009, pp. 367, 370.

²²⁹ Jackson 1989, pp. 48–51.

²³⁰ Jackson 2009, pp. 377, 366, 378–84, 371–2, 363, 365, 377. This took place before US troops were stationed there – a factor often wrongly seen as central to the emergence of Thai LGBT identities.

²³¹ Jackson 1989, p. 195.

²³² Altman 2000, pp. 141–2, 149–50.

²²⁰ Puat 2007, pp. 87.

²²¹ Karilsky 1989, p. 355.

²²² Farber 2011, p. 189.

²²³ Crompton 1985, p. 336.

²²⁴ Boscoe and Murray 1997, pp. 4–6.

²²⁵ Hayes 2000, p. 276.

partner had either a wholly transgendered or a homosexual identity. Rather, *matís* were flexibly gendered, so that one woman or both took on a particularly strong, masculine persona at one time or another. The same colonial constellation produced similar *matí* patterns among Afro-Surinamese men, linked to the relatively great numbers of male sex workers and the frequency with which even prominent married men were spotted at male *matí* parties.²⁴⁶

The case of the Navajo transgendered *náálkeché* Hastiin Klah (1869–1939) shows how imperialism could influence sexual regimes on reservations even when it did not rely on their labour force for capitalist production. Although the US Christian authorities were hostile to Navajo traditions generally and transgender identity in particular, Klah's skills as a shaman were highly valued as the Navajos returned to traditional religion in response to the stresses of reservation life. With confinement to the reservation, Navajo men lost the prestigious traditional activity of raiding, while the economic scope for trans artisans widened. Before Klah's time, Navajo weaving had been secular and done by women; Klah created an entirely new artifact – large weavings depicting ceremonial designs – which were bought by wealthy art collectors and museums.²⁴⁷ Historical factors – and notably the impact of imperialism – were thus crucial to the shaping of his twentieth-century beirdache role.

Despite direct European colonisation, the Islamic world too proved resistant at first to the newly developed heteronormativity of the imperialist period, developing a distinctive same-sex regime that combined traditional intergenerational patterns with colonial ones. This led to a widespread belief in Europe that, as one French naval doctor put it in 1893, 'The Arab is an inveterate pederast',²⁴⁸ and to attempts at suppression. During the French colonial mandate, for example, an article derived from Vichy legislation against 'unnatural sexual intercourse' was added to the Lebanese penal code.²⁴⁹ The European vision of an endemic Arab homosexuality reflected the imposition of an emerging European heteronormative view of human sexuality on a part of the world that had never known it, where despite the condemnation of specific

246 Webber 2006, pp. 193–4, 185–6, 193, 252, 271, n. 12. Webber has suggested that the prevalence of gender-polarised relationships may be a kind of optical illusion, simply because relationships 'structured according to this principle are more visible than others' (2006, p. 197). My response would be, in keeping with my overall focus on what is socially dominant in a same-sex regime, that what is publicly visible matters more in defining a gender and sexual order than private arrangements between individuals, which often diverge from the predominant public norms.

247 Roscoe 1994, pp. 357–9.

248 Aldrich 2003, p. 16.

249 Makarem 2011, p. 99.

acts Islam co-existed with rich same-sex cultural traditions. The homosexual identities that French and other European colonial officials and visitors projected onto Arabs were for many Europeans evidence of Arab inferiority.

The Islamic world itself changed with the partial adoption of heteronormative sexualities as part of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century attempts at autonomous development. Joseph Massad has described a host of modern Arab attempts to deny, downplay or condemn traditional Arab openness to same-sex desire. For example, erotic poetry focusing on youths or men, widespread in Arabic literature for centuries, 'disappeared completely as a poetic genre' around the late nineteenth century, while in the twentieth century many Arab critics denounced ninth-century poet Abu Nuwas's famous praise of youthful male beauty.²⁵⁰ Among Jews too, as European colonisers attributed homosexuality to a decadent Arab culture, both traditionalist rabbis in Muslim countries and the modernisers of the Alliance Israélite Universelle increasingly tended to attribute same-sex relations among Jews to Muslim influence.²⁵¹

In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Iran as well, as Afshar Nahmabadi has shown, 'heteronormalization of eros and sex became a condition of "achieving modernity": In the last decades of the Qajar dynasty's rule (until 1925), the male object of desire disappeared from painting, and homosexual erotic verse was increasingly censured. This was part of a process in which romantic as opposed to merely procreative heterosexuality was exalted so that educated women could act as the mothers and wives of a regenerated nation; veiling and women's segregation were seen both as obstacles to modernisation and as causes for men's lust after male youths. Late Ottoman reformers similarly tried to institutionalise monogamous heterosexuality.²⁵² Hindu nationalists in India too rejected transgender and same-sex attachments – as Muslim.

Yet more or less beneath the radar of colonial officials and Muslim or nationalist modernisers, the pattern of same-sex encounters between male adults and youths persisted. It acted as a magnet for Europeans who saw North Africa and the Middle East as sites of escape from their home countries' constraints. French writers – from Gustave Flaubert to Gide to Jean Genet – described sexual encounters with Arab males.²⁵⁴ The Jews of the Islamic world, who had not traditionally had a binary view of human sexuality any more than Muslims had, were no more immune than Muslims to the temptations of sex between

250 Massad, pp. 35, 102; Makarem 2011, p. 99.

251 Peirce 2009, p. 1336.

252 Nahmabadi 2005, pp. 3, 26, 163, 7, 156, 183, 193, 56, 150, 160 (citing Deniz Kandiyoti).

253 Loos 2009, p. 1316.

254 Aldrich 2000; Sheridan 1908.

males. One Frenchman commented in 1909, 'The Arabic and Jewish youth of Tunis readily prostitute themselves to foreigners'.²⁵⁵

Unlike the young Guardsmen and stable-lads of England, however, the youths of Tunis and other towns of the Islamic world had a tradition of their own, which persisted even in interaction with the imperial sexual order. By many accounts, this tradition allowed youths (up to a certain age) to play non-masculine roles without being seen as invert, to be frank about their same-sex desires, to be proud of their beauty, and even to be actively seductive.

A New Sexual Politics

While in some locations of the imperialist system men and women persisted in same-sex relations without adopting homosexual identities, in others politics became an increasingly significant factor in consolidating homosexual or gender-dissident identities. This was the case in Germany, the Netherlands and England from the end of the nineteenth century, where sexual and gender dissent was linked to 'sex reform' movements with feminist and socialist overtones.

The emergence of same-sex identities and communities was never a steady progress towards a clearly conceived objective. Often it was a response to 'moral panics' and waves of persecution that arose in the wake of the periodic crises punctuating capitalist development. The long depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw persecutions including the trial of Wilde, which in Ellis's words 'aroused inverts to take up a definite stand'.²⁵⁶ Ellis's own book *Sexual Inversion* was banned as obscene after a trial in 1898.²⁵⁷ Wilde's trial was a direct impetus for the founding of the German Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in 1897. More generally, it was Prussia's and the German Empire's anti-same-sex legislation that gave the impetus to the rise of sexology and the formation of a homosexual movement and identity there, as opposed to countries like France where decriminalisation had occurred a century earlier.²⁵⁸ In Italy too, unification led to the extension of criminalisation to parts of the peninsula where the Napoleonic Code had eliminated it. Together with the major role of secular science in combating the anti-national (and supposedly 'unnatural') Catholic Church, this helps explain the flourishing state of

Italian sexology – though decriminalisation in 1889 eliminated any impetus for a homosexual movement.²⁵⁹

German same-sex organising was fuelled by the extension of Prussia's repressive law after German unification in 1871 to parts of Germany where homosexuality had been decriminalised. Initially applied only to anal sex, the German ban was extended by an 1876 ruling to cover oral sex.²⁶⁰ US states also extended existing sodomy laws to cover oral sex.²⁶¹ New repressive laws were also adopted in Britain and Austria in the crisis years. In England, for example, the 1885 Labouchère amendment criminalised same-sex acts like mutual masturbation that had not previously fallen under the criminal law.²⁶² Lagging behind, Denmark passed new legislation against male prostitution in 1905,²⁶³ and the Netherlands in 1911 raised the age of consent for same-sex relations from sixteen to twenty-one.²⁶⁴

The decades in which a gradual, partial, uneven transition was occurring from the molly-dominant pattern to inversion to proto-gay homosexuality were decades of political struggle over sexuality. Much of it took place under the banner of 'sex reform'. Feminists were split between those like the British suffragist Christabel Pankhurst, who demanded 'votes for women and chastity for men', and those who took up emerging conceptions of heterosexuality, campaigned for contraception to free women from the fear of pregnancy, and advocated marriage founded on love and mutual sexual satisfaction rather than procreation or economic security. The more daring pro-sex feminists and other sex reformers defended premarital sex for women as well as men, at least as a preparation for a pleasurable marriage.²⁶⁵

Divisions among politicised homosexuals paralleled divisions over sexuality in the first wave of feminism. More conservative men could see penetrating an invert, like penetrating a female prostitute, as a natural outlet for a powerful male sexual drive. Neither sexual act necessarily involved mutual pleasure or affection, since the class privilege of and payment by dominant men could make them indifferent to or even contemptuous of the person being penetrated. These relationships straddled class divides in a hierarchical and transactional way. Middle-class or bourgeois homosexuals might also hark

²⁵⁵ Albritch 2003, p. 62.

²⁵⁶ Weeks 1981, p. 103.

²⁵⁷ Beccalossi 2012, pp. 185–91.

²⁵⁸ Beachy 2010, p. 836.

²⁵⁹ Beccalossi 2012, pp. 36–7, 50, 27.

²⁶⁰ Beachy 2010, pp. 807–9.

²⁶¹ Shah 2005, p. 717.

²⁶² Weeks 1981, p. 87.

²⁶³ Herzog 2001, p. 77.

²⁶⁴ Van der Meer 2007, p. 141.

²⁶⁵ Herzog 2011, pp. 11, 17–18.

countries where urbanisation and dependent industrialisation did lead to the emergence of such communities. Even where reciprocal lesbian/gay sexuality did emerge, it often came later and took different forms, for several reasons: later and more limited industrialisation; later entry of women into the paid labour force; the greater strength of family structures due in part to less developed welfare states; and poverty, which limited people's participation in a gay ghetto founded on consumption. In Thailand, for example, the rapid rise of a gay community did not completely marginalise trans people, despite the introduction of gay publications, terms and trends into the *kathoey* world.¹³² Lesbian/gay communities could be slow to spread to provincial cities, let alone the countryside.

While European or North American influence may at times have facilitated the emergence of lesbian/gay communities, the process of dependent capitalist development was at least as significant. If anything, dependence on imperialist economies helped delay development of the material basis for lesbian/gay communities, by delaying the achievement of higher wages and expanded welfare states that crucially facilitated life outside existing families.¹³³

Economic ups and downs often slowed lesbian/gay community formation even in regions of the dependent world that had embarked upon widespread industrialisation. LGBT communities in the dependent world are particularly vulnerable to economic crises, which hit harder and deeper there, with all the social and political tensions they create. Communities' fragility helps explain why the first wave of Latin American LGBT movements – beginning in Argentina in 1969, Mexico in 1971, and Puerto Rico in 1974 – proved so vulnerable. Some movements were destroyed by dictatorships, as in Brazil from 1969¹³⁴ and Argentina after 1976. The rest retreated in almost every country in the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis and the 'lost decade' that followed. Same-sex communities and identities were generally able to flourish only later in the 1980s, and by the 1990s were being reshaped by the different economic and social climate of neoliberalism.

Different paces of secularisation were another factor in more rapid or slower emergence of LGBT communities. The power of Protestant fundamentalists in the US and the Catholic Church in Latin Europe contributed to a process that lagged behind the most secularised societies of Northern Europe, though nominally Catholic countries like Belgium and Spain quickly caught up with nominally Lutheran Scandinavia. The example of Turkish cities like Istanbul,

¹³² Jackson 1989, pp. 6–7, 12.

¹³³ Drucker 1996, p. 77.

¹³⁴ Green 1999a, pp. 196–8.

Ankara and Izmir showed the importance of secularisation (in the Turkish case the outcome of an anti-colonial revolution) to the rise of LGBT identities in the Islamic world; the commercial scenes and organising efforts there had no parallel as late as the 1990s even in major metropolises like Cairo and Karachi.¹³⁵

In India, despite formal secularisation with independence, the enduring social hegemony of Hinduism and to a lesser degree Islam (abetted by British policies of divide and rule) impeded the public affirmation of LGBT identities, especially with the rise of communalism from the 1990s.¹³⁶ Lebanon was an interesting intermediate case: despite the institutionalisation of religious communalism under French rule, the 'multi-religious, multi-confessional' nature of the society sometimes allowed more scope for LGBT scenes and communities.¹³⁷

It is not clear how much continuity there was in general between traditional Arab sexual culture and that of the later-twentieth-century Arab region. Although self-identified lesbians and gay men were beginning to emerge there, distinctive lesbian/gay identities did seem less visible in Arab countries, as a high proportion of Arab men reportedly continued to have sex with other men without identifying at all as gay, transgendered or even bisexual. With sex tourism in the Maghreb, the usual assumption seemed to be that foreign men's Arab sex partners were playing the active role, going through a youthful phase, or both. Some men penetrated transgendered or other males.¹³⁸

Still, the space for less reified same-sex formations, which had been fairly broad under classical imperialism in regions from Suriname to South African mining communities to the Islamic world, narrowed internationally under Fordism. Even in the Arab region, the forms taken by discreet sex between men sometimes suggested a slippage towards reciprocal lesbian/gay roles. For example, some Egyptian men spoke of 'face-to-face' sex, meaning that anal intercourse was avoided so as to evade issues of masculine or feminine roles.¹³⁹

But the slowness with which the lesbian/gay patterns that became hegemonic under Fordism took root in parts of the world where industrialisation was later and dependent did not mean that an invert-dominant regime simply persisted there. Gender roles and sexual patterns were going through profound changes in the dependent world as well. But by contrast with the Russian Bolsheviks, who had connected their country's own same-sex patterns with

¹³⁵ Van Griensven 1997, p. 45; Khan 1997, p. 275.

¹³⁶ Joseph and Dhall 2000, pp. 170–1.

¹³⁷ Makarem 2011, p. 100.

¹³⁸ Massad 2007, p. 364.

¹³⁹ Van Griensven 1997, p. 37.

some of the most advanced sociology and sexual emancipation movements in Germany. Forlister-era populist and bureaucratic regimes sought to 'modernise' their countries' family and sexual lives by repressing whatever failed to fit their top-down models.

Decolonisation and national liberation struggles led to shifts in sexual ideology in the dependent world. In economically dominated countries after decolonisation, the rise of a stronger state apparatus made possible more thorough sexual repression. The attempt to create nuclear family structures, seen as a crucial dimension of modernisation, was often a motive. Ironically, many governments playing on anti-imperialist sentiment associated same-sex eroticism with the resented West. Some colonised people associated same-sex relations with sex-segregated institutions such as prisons and migrant-labour compounds, which had spread with colonisation.

An ongoing tug-of-war began to define what in all this was global, national and local. In these debates, the idea of religious and/or ethnic 'tradition' or 'culture' was far from neutral; it reflected struggles for power, both between colonised and coloniser and among the colonised themselves.¹⁴⁰ A newly independent nation in particular had to act simultaneously as a modernising force and as the 'custodian of a fixed (in all senses of the word) identity, conferring precolonial past, in short, as the repository of tradition.'¹⁴¹ Often in fact the traditions in question were inventions of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, as many African 'tribal' traditions are as well.¹⁴² African presidents like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, for example, learned that homosexuality is 'un-African' as part of their Christian mission educations. Both the task of modernising and the task of affirming national identity could entail suppressing sexual realities at least as much as revealing, exploring or freeing them.

Before the Second World War, colonial ideology had pathologised the sexualities of non-European peoples, portraying non-European men in particular (like African-American men in the US) as sexually unbridled and threatening. Anti-colonial movements tended to turn the imagery upside down, exposing the falsehood of the sexual charges that justified repression of non-European men and the reality of sexual violence against and exploitation of colonised women. Unfortunately, this shift rarely brought any solace to those involved in same-sex relationships.

Anti-colonial struggles produced 'a narrative of "traditional sexuality" in which a hearty yet wholesome heterosexual appetite stood in proud opposition

to the dominant, emasculating colonial discourse.'¹⁴³ This was already visible early in the twentieth century in Iran's Constitutional movement, when men who were seen as failing to adequately defend their country's freedom were threatened with being covered in women's headscarves. Oppression was linked to transgressions against women's sexual integrity, defined as men's honor'. A Constitutionalist leaflet in 1909 charged that Iranian soldiers 'look like men but are not men; they were transgendered, womanly *mulhannas*'.¹⁴⁴ A similar rhetoric characterised later authoritarian populist regimes, like the PRI regime in Mexico and Peronism in Argentina, that masked their subservience in practice to US imperialism with fervent protestations of their cultural authenticity and moral purity.

This kind of rhetoric also marked national liberation movements. Sexual 'blindness' led a revolutionary like Frantz Fanon to claim that 'there is no homosexuality in Martinique'.¹⁴⁵ As late as the mid-1980s in South Africa, a United Democratic Front spokesman said publicly that homosexuality was a product of apartheid's deformation of the African family that would disappear in post-apartheid society. Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe have denounced such attitudes as 'Victorian dogma', which African political leaders 'have the audacity to claim is the backbone of our African cultural heritage'.¹⁴⁶

The falsehood of this sort of upside-down Eurocentrism was manifest in the Islamic world. The fact that Egypt and Pakistan both experienced colonial rule (by Britain), which Turkey escaped, helped account for the earlier growth of lesbian/gay formations in Turkey, even though European settlement in an Egyptian city like Alexandria was as great or greater than in any Turkish city, and the Christian minority in Egypt was proportionally far larger than in Turkey. British rule in Egypt and Pakistan left Islamic social hegemony unaffected or even strengthened, while Turkey went through a profound process of secularisation in the process of defending itself from European colonisation after the First World War. It was thus no accident that Turkey became, along with Indonesia, the Muslim-majority country where lesbian/gay communities were the strongest.¹⁴⁷

In Egypt, there was a heteronormative paradigm shift in the work of Nobel Prize-winning author Naguib Mahfouz. While Mahfouz's 1947 novel *Midnight Alley* portrayed same-sex sexuality as commonplace but public awareness of

143 Epprecht 2009, p. 1262; see also Puar 2007, p. 49.

144 Najmabadi 2005, pp. 212–13, 216, 218–19.

145 Shohet 2006, p. 272.

146 Hoad, pp. 568, 566.

147 Drucker 2000a, p. 29.

140 Kotzé 1989, p. 456.

141 Hoad 1999, p. 565.

142 Ranger 1992, pp. 211–62.

it as shameful, his 1957 novel *Sugar Street* portrayed male same-sex desire as an 'illness'. And Arab literature after the defeat in the 1967 war with Israel was pervaded by images of humiliating, emasculating penetration of Arab men,¹⁴⁸ Iranian society too, where same-sex intimacy was pervasive for centuries, gradually came under European influence to see it as abnormal, at the same time as women's portrayal as companionate wives and modern mothers undermined 'homosocial Iranian motherhood'.¹⁴⁹ This was not a 'straightforward imposition of European sexual mores on non-European societies', but rather a case of mimicry in the service of rebellion: 'becoming like them to overthrow them'.¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, these repressive strategies were bound to fail in eliminating desire or purging culture. Often the forbidden same-sex patterns were hidden in plain sight. Popular Egyptian and other Arab male singers of the 1950s and 1960s still used the word 'beloved' in the masculine form, for example, even when the songs ostensibly referred to females.¹⁵¹

LGBT people in the most urbanised regions of Latin America by the 1970s were the most successful of any communities in neo-colonial countries in throwing off the association between homosexuality and imperialist influence. This probably had something to do with their ties with US lesbian/gay liberation, whose identification with anti-imperialism and solidarity was at its height in those years. The Brazilian movement, for example, though rejecting indiscriminate borrowing of North American terminology, welcomed the contributions of British/US activist Winston Leyland when he came in an explicit spirit of solidarity in the late 1970s.¹⁵² Emerging LGBT communities in Asia, both at a greater cultural distance from Europe and North America and less politicised, were less likely to try to combine open LGBT identities with resistance to cultural neo-colonialism – perhaps because anti-imperialist tendencies were influenced in this period by Maoism, with its strong record of homophobia.

China and Cuba

If populist regimes in dependent capitalist countries were persistent in their efforts to stamp out homosexuality, bureaucratic regimes in countries where

148 Massad 2007, pp. 272–90; and see Drucker 2000a, pp. 31–2, 34.

149 Peirce 2009, pp. 1355–6.

150 Rao 2012.

151 Drucker 1996, p. 86.

152 Green 1999a, pp. 272–3.

capitalism was overthrown were ruthless. Despite the general relaxation of repression following Stalin's death in 1953, this pattern did not change fundamentally in the USSR before its collapse. Although there was perhaps a bit more room, for example, for a butch/femme subculture attested in a study in the late 1950s and early 1960s, men who had been convicted for sodomy were not included in the massive amnesties and waves of prisoner release in the mid-to-late 1950s. There was no question, then or later, of a return to the gender neutrality and lack of stigmatisation that had characterised the 1920s.¹⁵³ Although a controlled decriminalisation took place in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1961, and in East Germany in 1968, there was no move in this direction in the USSR. Only Gorbachev's *glasnost* policies in the late 1980s would make a public debate on decriminalisation possible once more.¹⁵⁴

The Chinese Revolution of 1945–9 brought an unremittingly anti-lesbian and anti-gay regime to power. The Chinese bureaucratic state prosecuted homosexuality as 'hooliganism' or as activities that involved 'roaming' beyond appropriate social borders. While the Maoist regime split Chinese society along class lines that overrode kinship, the family remained crucial to individuals' social status through the inheritance of a 'class label'.¹⁵⁵ While after 1949 in the People's Republic ideas about homosexual abnormality were couched in Marxist terms, similar attitudes existed in Taiwan and Hong Kong.¹⁵⁶

The Cuban Revolution, given its importance for revolutionaries all over Latin America, played a particularly negative role in associating the left with persecution of LGBTs. US imperialism helped foster this association in several ways. Given the fierce repression in the US in the 1950s, same-sex life was often 'channelled into illegal and lucrative offshore markets like the Havana underworld'. This pre-revolutionary sex tourism reinforced prejudice among Cuban revolutionaries, who had little familiarity with the kind of intellectual and artistic homosexual milieu that existed at the time in Mexico, Argentina or Brazil. US backing for a counter-revolutionary fifth column in Cuba in the early 1960s helped ensure that 'private space was invaded as never before'. The Soviet Union and Cuba's own Stalinist Popular Socialist Party also helped to fuel repressive attitudes,¹⁵⁷ as did a growing tendency to apply the Soviet model.¹⁵⁸

153 Healey 2001, pp. 256–7, 241–3, 229–30, 249–50.

154 Healey 2001, pp. 245–9.

155 Rofel 1999, pp. 459, 464.

156 Hirsch 1990, p. 107.

157 Arguëlles and Rich 1980, pp. 444–5, 447–8.

158 Lumsden 1996, pp. 180, 182–3.

'regular gay men and women looking for a safe space',¹⁴³ it has facilitated the organisation of 'highly specialized communities of sexual interest'.¹⁴⁴ There was room for some of these sub-identities under the umbrella of 'normal' lesbian/gay identity. For others, insufficiently compatible with a stable position in the job market and neoliberal public space, marginalisation loomed – and queerness beckoned.

Homonationalism

Alongside demarcation as a stable minority, growing gender conformity and the separation of gay from trans, a fourth feature of the new gay normality has been the increasing incorporation of some lesbians and gay men into the imperialist nation. Here gender identity and sexuality were still closely linked, especially for men. For centuries, masculinity has been defined in feudal and capitalist societies by a positively valued propensity for violence, whether in the military, in everyday interactions with other men, or in sublimated form in sport. Incompetence at fighting and sport, and exclusion from the military, were therefore markers of insufficiently masculine men – while atypical competence, athleticism and military careers were markers of insufficiently feminine women.

Exclusion from the military, and therefore from the ranks of full male citizens, has often been one of the last forms of discrimination to fall. It was explicitly reaffirmed, for example, when homosexuality was decriminalised in Britain in 1967 (and only lifted in 2000), and perpetuated in US President Bill Clinton's curiously contradictory 'don't ask, don't tell' policy, adopted in 1993 and only lifted in 2011. The demand to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation in the military has been a constituent element of a new, nationalist homonormativity. This has been particularly evident in Israel, where Jewish open gay men's inclusion in the army was a marker of their incorporation into the Zionist project – understandably viewed without enthusiasm by Palestinian queers, who like other Palestinians in Israel face pervasive discrimination on the grounds of their exclusion from military service.

Jason Ritchie has recounted his discovery that each gay bar in Tel Aviv has a 'sort of checkpoint... manned by a queer agent of Israeli nationalism, whose job it was to determine who belongs in this gay/Israeli space and who does not'. More broadly, gay Israelis 'consolidate their membership in the nation' by

acting as 'gatekeepers at a metaphorical checkpoint, where queer Palestinians are inspected, policed, and occasionally admitted into the fold of Israeli gayness as "victims" of Palestinian culture' – or more often 'denied entry as excessively Arab or insufficiently "gay"'.¹⁴⁵

More generally in the twenty-first century, the instrumentalisation of lesbian/gay rights in the service of imperialist and Islamophobic ideologies, which Puar has defined as 'homonationalism', has played a crucial role in integrating lesbian/gay people into the neoliberal order.¹⁴⁶ Its upshot, or at least its intended upshot, is a 'seemingly seamless articulation of queerness with an imperial nation state'.¹⁴⁷ Particularly, but not only, in countries like the Netherlands¹⁴⁸ and Denmark, where both same-sex partnership rights and anti-immigrant racism are strongly developed, this homonationalism has been key to consolidating and taming lesbian/gay identity. More broadly, it is an integral part of the neoliberal multiculturalism that masks capitalism's reliance on regional and racial hierarchies.¹⁴⁹ More generally in Europe, sexuality has become 'the sign of the European Union's benevolence' and a justification for prejudice against non-Europeans.¹⁵⁰

Blatant racism has hardly disappeared; it continues notably in the form of stereotypes of black sexuality.¹⁵¹ Increasingly in the last two decades, however, popular and right-wing racism based on skin colour has made way for a racism that is more often pseudo-cultural than pseudo-biological, and particularly for Islamophobia. It coexists in Northern Europe and North America with an ersatz form of multiculturalism that blurs the persistent, deniable, shifting but still crucial global divide between dominant and dominated groups and nations.

The French variant is an intensified emphasis on 'republican universalism', which relegates expressions of difference to the private sphere. The French LGBT mainstream has embraced this republican ideology in a way that obscures social and economic inequality and racism among LGBT people, which are making sexual relationships and ties of solidarity across class and race lines more difficult. A recent survey in the French gay magazine *l'Étu* showed that LGBT people of immigrant origin had trouble finding white sex

¹⁴⁵ Ritchie 2010, pp. 557–560–1.

¹⁴⁶ Puar 2007, pp. xxiv, 38–9.

¹⁴⁷ Rosenberg and Villarejo, p. 10.

¹⁴⁸ Meppschien, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010, Jivraj and De Jong 2011.

¹⁴⁹ Rosenberg and Villarejo, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ Ferguson and Hong 2012, p. 1060.

¹⁵¹ Wekkor 2006, p. 249.

¹⁴³ Makarew 2011, p. 102.

¹⁴⁴ Wekkor 2011, p. 169.

partners for more than one-off encounters or brief affairs. Across the imperialist countries, ethnic minorities and working-class people are eroticised, notably in pornography, while the dominant gay image becomes increasingly white and middle class in increasingly racialised societies.¹⁵²

A growing number of gay men and lesbians have been prepared to accept such exclusions, or at least look the other way, as they pursued professional, business or political careers in a number of capitalist societies. Without necessarily renouncing or hiding their difference from the social norm, many of these people have preferred not to 'flaunt' it. Even the lesbian/gay middle-class layers that lived off gay businesses and non-profits – far from all of whom were among the real economic winners of recent decades, but who tended to be spoken for by those among them who were – preferred in general to keep lesbian/gay community expressions culturally inoffensive. Another layer of middle-class or middle-class-identified lesbian/gay people, who were making *their* careers inside mainstream businesses and institutions, sometimes cringed at manifestations of an LGBT community that marked them off too much from other people of their class. Many of these people wanted to pursue their careers in straight companies and institutions while being open about their same-sex relationships – fewer of them were willing than in the past to contract cross-sex marriages and to keep their same-sex lives hidden – but otherwise deny or minimise differences between them and the white, middle-class norm.

The rise of lesbian/gay professionalism has taken different, subtler forms in the mutation of academic lesbian/gay studies. While the initial radicalism of Black and Latino studies in the US in the 1960s and 1970s gradually and partially morphed into the ethnic pluralism of neoliberal multiculturalism, some lesbian/gay academics whose fields had been modelled on Black and Latino studies followed a comparable trajectory. The fact that the space for queer approaches has expanded more quickly in literature departments than in the social sciences has sometimes helped accentuate a turn towards cultural celebration and away from challenges to the powers that be. And the fact that queer studies is far bigger, relatively and absolutely, in the US than anywhere else has helped spread the post-modern inclinations of US queer studies internationally.

Despite an often enduringly confrontational rhetoric, a professional layer has provided the solid social base for the most moderate currents of LGBT movements, joining the movement from the 1980s when it became safer, moderates

further reinforced its moderation and made professionalism a 'sign of accomplishment' rather than, as it often was in the 1960s and 1970s, suspect.¹⁵³

Normal Gay Families

Such moderates have often seen same-sex marriage as the culminating moment in the process of gay emancipation. While the rights to marry and to adopt children do bring immediate, practical, crucial benefits to same-sex couples from many different class backgrounds, they can be the culmination of *some* gay people's integration into the productive and reproductive order of gendered capitalism. The call for these rights is a demand for equality, but also in some cases for equal class and racial privilege – and 'rights of property and inheritance in particular'.¹⁵⁴

Paradoxically, neoliberalism has in many ways been loosening family ties. Just as ties to a single company and a single occupation have been eroding, neoliberalism fosters a kind of 'modular... *lean relationship*' parallel to lean production networks.¹⁵⁵ Ironically, therefore, same-sex marriage has become possible in more capitalist societies at a time when the significance of marriage has in some ways substantially declined. In Sweden and other Northern European countries, 'cohabitation and marriage became virtually indistinguishable legally and socially'.¹⁵⁶ At the same time, neoliberal cutbacks in social services, by privatising the provision of basic needs, have been restoring the centrality of the family unit to the social reproduction of labour – in classed ways.

Legal same-sex marriage or partnership can in this context secure not only much needed benefits for same-sex couples generally, but also specific advantages for middle-class and more secure working-class lesbians and gays. In this situation, limiting the 'horizon of queer politics to the right to marry', despite the intrinsic justice of the demand, props up not only a heteronormative model of monogamy but also the 'bourgeois articulation of privacy with property'.¹⁵⁷ One Canadian study showed, for example, that legal recognition of same-sex partnerships resulted on average in higher incomes for high-income LGBT people and lower incomes for low-income ones. This pattern also correlates

¹⁵³ Faderman 1991, pp. 274–5.

¹⁵⁴ Puar 2007, p. 29.

¹⁵⁵ Woltersdorff 2011, pp. 175–6.

¹⁵⁶ Coontz 2005, pp. 271–2.

¹⁵⁷ Floyd 2006, p. 398.

¹⁵² Cervulle and Rees-Roberts 2010, pp. 17–18, 80, 23, 134, 69, 71, 146.

marriage by British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron has shown. There were, of course, lesbians and gays advocating same-sex marriage for years before Conservatives and Christian Democrats began even considering it. But today the actual achievement of same-sex marriage is increasingly a collaborative effort by a mainstream lesbian/gay advance guard in alliance with a centre-left or centre-right main force.

The gay right is not the purveyor of a specific same-sex identity. In fact, it has projected strikingly different sexual attitudes in different countries. Clearly the moralistic preaching of fidelity and conformity is not universal even in the US gay right: this is only one face of neoliberal gay normality, and not necessarily the dominant one. In the Netherlands, Fortuyn embodied a sexual libertarianism and was uncritically, openly celebratory of some queer sexual practices – one more sign that non-monogamy does not in itself necessarily challenge the instrumental attitude towards human relations typical of neoliberal society. But in most countries, the gay right tends to downplay queer identity and sexuality, and advocate 'normality': integration into existing families and churches. It was no accident that the lesbian/gay 2000 march in the US took place under the banner of 'faith and family'.

However much the gay right's sexual attitudes may vary, it seems to have no capacity to link up with any alternative queer community or to contribute to defining any alternative queer identity. It can only oscillate between celebrating gay capitalism and defining queer sexuality as a purely private matter, preferably to be confined to a same-sex marital bedroom. This has precluded, at least so far, the rise of anything like a true queer right. On the contrary, the rise of the gay right has helped close the interregnum of 1968–73 lesbian/gay liberation, when the consolidation of a gender-normative lesbian/gay identity was briefly interrupted by a prominent and sometimes key role for trans and other gender-dissident activists in radical lesbian/gay groups.

Spreading from the gay right to the LGB centre and centre-left, an interpretation of 'lesbian/gay' has taken hold that makes it virtually indistinguishable from the homophiles' old, gender-normative conception of the homosexual. Ironically, as John D'Emilio has pointed out, an initially anti-capitalist gay liberation movement 'opened the door to legitimate investment in gay sex' and created the conditions for a new gay capitalism. This accounts for some striking continuities between the homophile movements that grew up before the mid-1960s and the gay right of recent decades²⁹ – leapfrogging over the radical legacy of the liberationist interregnum between them.

29 D'Emilio 2002, pp. 69, 227.

The Right and Homonationalism

The gay right as a whole is homonationalist. In the Cold War years, the US military had become a mainstay of racial liberalism, symbolised by Colin Powell's rise to its command, and even a certain kind of feminism, incarnated in the George W. Bush administration by Condoleezza Rice. Imperialism acquired a gender dimension, portraying women in the US as 'saviors and rescuers' of oppressed women elsewhere. Imperialist ideology has also always had a sexual dimension. The novelty is that it now has a same-sex dimension. The general orgy of patriotism in the US after 9/11 was picked up in US LGBT communities as well. 'The American flag appeared everywhere in gay spaces, in gay bars and gay gyms, and gay pride parades [featured] the pledge of allegiance, the singing of the national anthem, and floats dedicated to national unity'. Many middle-class gays and lesbians also responded to appeals to save the US by continuing to buy, 'marking this homonational consumer as an American patriot par excellence'.³⁰

Neoliberal multiculturalism also wards off, in Jodi Melamed's words, any mobilisation against the neoliberal order by 'the racialized poor... by portraying this class as strangely susceptible to terrorist seduction'. In the words of the 2006 US National Security Strategy, 'In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in society'.³¹

It is a commonplace to observe that with 9/11 the Arab and Islamic world supplanted North American and Western European rulers with the enemy image they needed after the Cold War. This enemy image is often gendered. Examples of the sexual repression of women in different parts of the world or segments of the population are exploited ideologically as evidence of the supposedly more civilised character of imperialist countries. Campaigns to free Muslim women (with or without their participation or enthusiasm) are one obvious example. The US Feminist Majority Foundation tried to enlist Afghan women in the US war, leading the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan to condemn it as a manifestation of hegemonic, U.S.-centric, ego driven, corporate feminism. 'There was a flurry in 2006 of condemnations of anti-gay repression in Iran – the details of the specific incidents involved were disputed among international human rights observers, though the repressive

³⁰ Puat 2007, pp. 40, 5 (citing Jnderpal Grewal), 2, 43, 66–7.

³¹ Melamed 2006, pp. 16–17.

character of Iranian sexual legislation was not – just in time to provide ammunition for the U.S. Bush administration's campaign for military intervention.³²

Condemnations of homophobic measures fall on fertile ground among LGBT people. Resentment of religious bigotry runs deep in LGBT communities, particularly among people who themselves suffered from it during their own Catholic, Protestant or Jewish upbringings. Indignation at anti-LGBT persecution by Islamic fundamentalist regimes and movements is a logical consequence of opposition to Christian bigotry. The political problem arises when people's resentment is projected away from their own context and experience, and focused on the Islamic world – as if Islam were inherently more homophobic than Christianity, a notion flatly contradicted by the preponderance of the historical evidence – especially when that resentment is manipulated to fit an imperialist agenda. The resentment can become poisonous when it is generalised to extend to all people of Muslim origin and/or Arabs, independently of any positions individuals take on LGBT issues.

The litany, 'Homosexual acts are against Islamic law' – eliding the question of what individual Muslims or groups of Muslims think or do – has been used to create a monolithic image of Muslims and Arabs. This essentialism is sometimes used to violent and even deadly effect. Anthropologist Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind*, and especially its chapter on sexual taboos in Arab culture, served not only as the neoconservative bible on Arab behaviour, but also as a justification for forcing Iraqi prisoners to engage in same-sex acts as a way to turn them into informants. Whereas a century ago, images of pervasive Arab homosexuality served as a pretext for European colonial repression (or homosexual sex tourism), in Abu Ghraib the (perverse) repression of the Arab prisoners [was] highlighted in order to efface the rampant hypersexual excesses of the U.S. prison guards.³³

In the space of a decade or two, the place of sexuality in the hegemonic European and North American view of the Islamic world has been virtually flipped upside down. Today, Europe and North America are seen as bearers of sexual enlightenment – mainly women's emancipation, and to a lesser extent LGBT rights – to an Islamic world seen as benighted and backward. The issue of same-sex formations among people of Muslim origin and in the Islamic world became even more of a political and intellectual minefield after 9/11. In a bizarre twist, neoconservatives and other rightists who for decades were hostile to feminism and the lesbian/gay movement have repackaged themselves as defenders of oppressed Arab women and gays. This ideological prism seriously

³² Puar 2007, pp. 6, ix–xi.

³³ Puar 2007, pp. 4, 138–9 (citing Seymour Hersh), 83–4, 94.

distorts the interpretation of Arab sexualities, as Will Roscoe and Stephen Murray have pointed out, and does no justice to the historical 'variety, distribution, and longevity of same-sex patterns in Islamic societies'.³⁴ Islamophobia masquerading as support for women's equality rears its head in the most surprising places, as in remarks by Fidel Castro – no fan of either neoliberalism or the 'war on terror' – blaming the persistence of machismo in Cuba on 'Moorish' influences via Spain.³⁵

The irony is that while the 'heteronormalisation of society was seen to be a marker of modernity in the 19th century, the exact opposite has become the case' now. Yet there is a constant: 'the "West" continues to arrogate to itself the power to define the content of modernity, to shift the goalposts of modernity ... as it sees fit'.³⁶

9/11 gave the right in Europe and North America a unique opportunity to redefine itself as feminist and sexually tolerant. Military intervention in the Islamic world has been legitimated in part by portraying Muslims as 'sexually deviant' – whether repressed and frustrated or polygamous and sexually excessive or both simultaneously.³⁷ This has helped many rightists, after acting as a not especially effective brake on feminist and sexual change for half a century, to reinvent themselves in short order as defenders of Western enlightenment, women and even gays against 'Islamic fascism'. LGBT and feminist movements have been harnessed to a political project aimed at obscuring responsibility for colonialism and global inequality by focusing instead on the allegedly unique misogyny and homophobia of non-Western countries.³⁸

Anti-LGBT attitudes on the part of some non-white and poor people allow middle-class white gays who are drifting rightwards to pose as champions of LGBT blacks and immigrants while stigmatising other blacks and immigrants as homophobic.³⁹ In countries like the Netherlands and Denmark, right-wing forces have shown since 2001 how Islamophobia can be used to win right-wing acceptance or even hegemony in mainstream lesbian/gay organisations – unwittingly abetted by Muslim fundamentalists like Rotterdam imam Khalid El-Mounni, who in 2001 declared that Europeans who condoned same-sex marriage were 'less than pigs and dogs'.⁴⁰

³⁴ Roscoe and Murray 1997, pp. 4–6.

³⁵ Lumsden 1996, p. 46.

³⁶ Rao 2012.

³⁷ Jakobsen 2012, p. 25.

³⁸ Cernulle and Rees-Roberts 2010, p. 144.

³⁹ Puar 2007, pp. 28–9.

⁴⁰ Herzog 2011, p. 201.

In France, the immigrant suburbs of Paris and other major cities are portrayed as breeding grounds of homophobia, 'a few zones where the light of republican liberty had not yet penetrated' – mysteriously, since the media tend to focus on religious prejudice and downplay discrimination and poverty.⁴¹ The suburbs abruptly forfeited their supposed monopoly on prejudice in 2013, when mass mobilisations against same-sex marriage revealed the depth of homophobia among millions of white French people. The norm defined by gay ghettos like the Marais in Paris or the Castro in San Francisco, magnets for LGBT people in the far larger heteronormative communities around them, nonetheless works to reinforce a straight norm in the larger society, white or non-white.

Even in the US, neoconservatives – the Republican faction least ideologically committed to Christian fundamentalism – have shed their former secular brand of social conservatism and homophobia⁴² and repackaged themselves as virtual feminists. The fact that the right was at least temporarily shaken and divided by its debacle in Iraq opened more space for gay voices in the centre and centre-right of US politics.

The new homonationalist right is also fervently Zionist. Unfortunately, broader international and regional lesbian/gay networks, especially those in or run from the imperialist countries, have tended to embrace Israeli homonationalism and ignore or sidestep Palestinian objections, as in InterPride's decision to hold World Pride in Jerusalem in 2006.⁴³ This tendency has been very strong in North America, as witnessed by Toronto Pride's decision in 2010 (later reversed) to ban *Queers Against Israeli Apartheid* from marching, and the New York LGBT Centre's decision in 2011 to ban a Palestine solidarity group from meeting there – enforced by a director from a corporate rather than a grassroots background – later transformed into a moratorium⁴⁴ that was only lifted in 2013. A similar mind-set was visible in the decision of the International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association to hold its 2009 conference in Tel Aviv, over the protests of groups like the Lebanese LGBT *HELEM*.⁴⁵ In general, mainstream Israeli, Western European and North American lesbian/gay groups have been complicit in 'pinkwashing': celebrating Israeli gay life and rights in a way that includes Israel in the charmed circle of the enlightened, while explicitly or implicitly excluding Palestinians, other Arabs and Muslims.

41 Cerville and Rees-Roberts 2010, pp. 39, 141–3.

42 See, for example, Dieter 1980.

43 Pinar 2007, p. 16.

44 Schulman 2012, pp. 117–18, 121, 157–8, 170.

45 Schulman 2012, p. 126.

The emerging homonationalism of sections of the Western European and North American hard right has led it to selectively ignore the neoliberal agenda of many of the world's most homophobic forces. The Mubarak regime responsible for the 2001 Queen Boat raid in Egypt, and the ensuing wave of anti-LGBT repression a few months before 9/11, was, of course, one of the key US allies in the Middle East and one of the main Arab proponents of neoliberal policies. The newly pro-gay right has also generally avoided noticing the ongoing homophobic repression by US allies like Morocco, the Gulf States and the Saudi kingdom (the world's single most theocratic state and the oldest US ally in the Middle East).⁴⁶ European and North American media have failed to report the blatant homophobia of the imperialist-linked, anti-Syrian bloc in Lebanon (which expelled gay activists from its 'Freedom Camp') since 2005, or the widespread prejudice or cowardice of Western-funded human rights organisations in failing to defend LGBT victims.⁴⁷

US right-wing lip service to lesbian/gay rights is worse than useless to LGBT Arab people. The Shiite parties, militias and gangs that dominate Iraq today are guilty of vicious repression of people engaged in same-sex sexualities, which the US occupiers have hardly lifted a finger to stop. In one incident in 2007, an Iraqi LGBT activist heard Americans talking in the next room while Iraqi police were torturing him.⁴⁸

Gay Social-Liberalism

The combination of growing homonationalism and gender conformity in LGBT communities with growing straight tolerance for gay normality has helped open up mainstream space for a lesbian/gay rights agenda. The weakening of the radical left has helped fray what ties it had with LGBT movements. Yet even as the modernising right has opened up to homonormative politics, many LGBT groups are held back from aligning with it by memories of the right's history of homophobia. As political partners for LGBT activism, this mostly leaves the broad array of forces that can be called 'social-liberal': forces accepting the basic parameters of neoliberalism but trying to put a more human, social face on policy. These include the Democratic Party in the US and social-democratic, green and left-liberal parties in Europe. They also include a once-radical force like the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), the latter-day populists of the Mexican

46 Achcar 2002, pp. 31–5.

47 Makarewicz 2011, pp. 102–7.

48 Ireland 2007.

Nigeria and say nothing about the violence and economic exploitation of the Shell Oil Company on the land and bodies of Nigerians'.¹⁰⁶ An agenda for LGBT equality is 'reductive and distorting', Scott Long has written, when it would only win LGBT people equal rights to the poverty and violence of a fundamentally unequal world. Cutting aid to Africa, specifically, is a gesture in favour of sexual equality that risks deepening economic inequality, thus making 'some people less equal in the name of making others more so'.¹⁰⁷ Not to mention the political inequality that is underscored when whole African nations are penalised for violations of LGBT rights, when no one suggests penalising the whole of the United States (for example) for the murder of a trans person each month.

More discussion is needed about what tactics actually work. At the least, LGBT rights should be situated in the broader framework of sexual and reproductive rights, so that civil rights issues are not severed from their social and economic context. More thought should also be devoted to the risk that condemnations and retaliations from Europe and North America might further isolate LGBT Africans in their own countries. A British and German refusal aid to Malawi following arrests in 2009, for example, led to increased homophobia and threats to LGBT activists, who had to go into hiding.¹⁰⁸ The result can be, in Long's words, 'More blood. More pain'. LGBT Africans need to have more of a say over their degree of visibility, if international solidarity is not to be reduced to '*defending the defenders after they're dead*'. Finally, while the right of asylum for persecuted LGBT people must absolutely be affirmed and honoured far more than it now is, exile can mean for activists the destruction of 'the way people live as connected and implicated beings in their cultures, contexts, communities' – 'social death'.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, where LGBT communities are under siege, LGBT refugees and migrants to other countries can help defend and sustain queers in their countries of origin. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has included sexual identity among the grounds for 'well-founded fear of persecution' entitling people to refugee status,¹¹⁰ LGBT refugees' rights are routinely ignored and denied as anti-immigrant prejudice spreads in country after country. In addition, restrictions on movement, especially since 9/11, have highlighted commonalities between trans people and immigrants, refugees and the

¹⁰⁶ Parrow 2011/2012.

¹⁰⁷ Long 2003.

¹⁰⁸ Abolafia 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Long 2003.

¹¹⁰ Moriarty 2007, p. 25.

undocumented. Defending LGBT people thus involves joining campaigns that link fights against gender-normativity and homonationalism to resistance to state policing of gender and national boundaries.¹¹¹

Solidarity between LGBT movements in imperialist and dependent countries has often piggybacked on the strong cultural influence traditionally exerted by imperialist cultures. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), initially founded and run largely by lesbians and gay men in imperialist countries, has contributed to the growth of movements in the dependent world by carrying out solidarity actions, sending materials and money, and 'twinning' richer and poorer groups. International solidarity has also been a source of support for LGBT activism in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, and Eastern Europe more broadly.¹¹² Yet sometimes the vision and solidarity of European and North American activists have had unfortunate limits, as when the 1985 ILGA conference in Toronto rejected a resolution supporting anti-imperialist movements. More recently, more leadership for ILGA at world level has come from Latin America, Asia and Africa – but resources have flowed disproportionately to ILGA's European region, which receives funding from the European Union.

In recent years, interaction among LGBT movements within specific regions has become at least as important as connections to imperialist countries. The Asian Lesbian Network's first conference in 1990 and Asian gay conferences beginning in 1986 helped consolidate Asian organising; Asian networking has continued in the face of obstacles, most dramatically the Islamic fundamentalist attack on the ILGA Asia conference in Surabaya, Indonesia in 2010.¹¹³ Latin American and Caribbean Lesbian Gatherings beginning in 1987 played an even bigger role in their region. LGBT movements in the dependent world have sometimes been spurred on by compatriots returning from imperialist countries or helped by immigrants in North America or Europe who have organised in solidarity with them. For example, the first two LGBT South Asian organisations were founded in 1985–6 in the North American diaspora and then spread back to India.¹¹⁴

The solidarity shown by Lebanese and Palestinian LGBT groups towards the rest of the Arab region has also been significant. One tragic factor in this region has been the mass movement of refugees, including LGBT refugees, across the Middle East. The Lebanese group *HELEM* has provided support to Iraqi

¹¹¹ Stryker 2008, p. 150.

¹¹² Healey 2001, pp. 246–7.

¹¹³ Mazdafah 2012, p. 246.

¹¹⁴ Drucker 1996, p. 97.

refugees fleeing persecution based on their sexual orientation, and campaigned for the rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who face major discrimination. HELEM has remained open to everyone living in Lebanon, even at the cost of losing some Lebanese members.¹¹⁵

Solidarity becomes more complicated in the Arab region when the issue arises of working with Israeli LGBT groups. Mailey of the Palestinian group Al Qaws has said that 'unfortunately, many of the Israeli LGBT groups have come to accept the nation and strive to become integrated in it'. Al Qaws has preferred working with Israeli anti-Zionist groups. For many queers worldwide, the Palestinian struggle is also a fight against Israeli self-legitimation through highlighting lesbian/gay rights in Israel ('pinkwashing'), a fight waged by the coalition Palestinian Queers for BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions). 'Israel commits human rights violations and occupies another people and then abuses my difficulties and my name by saying my society is backward and homophobic', Mailey has said. 'My struggle is dismissed and my people are demonized'.¹¹⁶

All these struggles benefit from queering history in anti-Eurocentric ways, uncovering Asia, Africa and Latin America's same-sex past. In the last few decades, scholars have been busily uncovering what many nationalist forces had spent even longer burying. A wealth of material has been emerging about same-sex formations in, for example, Africa and Asia. They have also been busily linking together what Eurocentric and nationalist historians had worked to separate out, for example, showing the centuries-long sexual interactions among captives, converts, renegades, diplomats, expatriates, tourists and their captors or hosts in Europe and the Islamic world,¹¹⁷ and the great influence of Europe and the US on both colonised and non-colonised Asia and of Chinese sexual culture on other East and Southeast Asian countries.¹¹⁸ And they have been demonstrating the enormous range of sexual formations in, for example, Africa.¹¹⁹

Against Islamophobia

In responding to right-wingers repackaging themselves in recent years as defenders of oppressed Arab women and even gays, the left has sometimes

been divided. When international human rights or LGBT groups have issued alerts about persecution of Middle Eastern LGBT people (for example, in Iran), some LGBT anti-imperialists have denounced the critics for contributing to the US war drive.¹²⁰ Others have insisted on the importance of both opposition to US intervention and solidarity with LGBT people. Yet international LGBT movements have been hamstrung by their relative weakness in and ignorance of the Arab region. The ill-thought out tactics and sometimes 'outright colonialist mentality' of some LGBT groups in imperialist countries may sometimes even play into the hands of repressive forces.¹²¹ There is an urgent need to link imperialism, gender and sexuality.

One key point is that there is neither a historical nor a logical connection between anti-imperialism and cultural nativism. The British Empire was careful not to interfere with Islamic domination of civil society in countries it ruled such as Egypt and Pakistan. By contrast, Muslim Turkey's fierce resistance to colonisation after the First World War and Muslim Indonesia's struggle for independence after the Second World War involved far-reaching secularisation, albeit from above by authoritarian regimes. It is no accident that Turkey and Indonesia have stronger LGBT communities and movements today than the Arab countries, almost all of which enjoyed the dubious benefits of European colonialism.¹²²

The relative rarity of LGBT identities in Arab countries today is not due to lack of European and North American influence; European influence has been stronger in the Arab region than in a country like Thailand, with its burgeoning LGBT scenes. On the contrary, as Joseph Massad's wide-ranging analysis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Arabic literature has shown, in the colonial period European influence was mobilised to promote heterosexuality and suppress the centuries-old wealth of Arab same-sex forms.¹²³ Factors like the

115 Makarem 2007, p. 107.

116 Mailey and De Jong 2011.

117 Peirce 2009, p. 1126.

118 Loos 2009, pp. 131–13.

120 In a related argument, Joseph Massad has blamed repression in the Arab region largely on the lesbian/gay groups and human rights organisations that he calls the 'Gay International', asserting: 'By inciting discourse about homosexuals where none existed before, the Gay International is in fact *heterosexualizing* a world that is being forced to be fixed by a Western binary' (Massad 2007, p. 188). Protests by international groups have been more a reaction than a cause, however; their power is detestable compared to that of imperial powers or multinational capital. Moreover, in 'dismissing self-identified Arab queers as essentially inauthentic replicas of their Western counterparts, Massad overlooks their capacity to act as conscious agents' (Ruthe 2010, p. 567). In any event, the 'gay genie is out of the bottle... regardless of whether it was human rights groups, global media, or grassroots activists who rubbed the lamp' (Mitchell 2011, p. 674).

121 Makarem 2007, p. 104.

122 See Drucker 2000a, p. 29.

region's relatively low rate of female paid employment, which limit women's sexual independence and help narrow men's leeway for gender dissent, have probably been more important in holding back the rise of LGBT identities. Another obvious factor is what Gilbert Achcar has called 'the Arab despotism exception': the fact that the US continued for so many years before the 2011 Arab Spring to back dictatorships in the Middle East, due to its vital economic and geopolitical interests there, rather than risk the kind of transitions to nominal democracy that it allowed in much of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of Asia.¹²⁴ The result has been less freedom for political and social organising, and specifically for LGBT organising, in the Arab region.

Linking queer and anti-imperialist organising is therefore crucial. The example of the Lebanese LGBT group HELEM shows how effective LGBT participation in broad anti-imperialist movements can be in integrating LGBT people and their issues into a society and discourse of resistance. Based on the conviction that 'sexual liberation cannot be achieved through imperialism [or] detached from the wider struggle for democracy', in 2003 HELEM joined Lebanese mobilisations against the Iraq war, flying a rainbow flag at one demonstration and receiving prominent media attention. In 2006, HELEM joined the grassroots solidarity movement against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and became part of the largest independent resistance and refugee and war victim relief campaign. Beirut's LGBT community centre became part of Beirut's busiest relief headquarters during four weeks of bombing. One LGBT supporter of the campaign reported feeling 'happiness like never before' when an official of the Shiite fundamentalist Hizbollah thanked him for his work – a striking contrast with the homophobia expressed by the liberal forces behind the Cedar Revolution. Unfortunately, HELEM's appeal for solidarity to an international LGBT conference meeting at the time in Montreal elicited strong opposition, as well as support.¹²⁵

Beyond these promising beginnings, no one can know how or in what forms Arab LGBT communities and movements will develop. In particular, no one knows what proportion of Arabs who have sex with people of the same sex identify or will come to identify as lesbian, gay, trans or bisexual. But this is no argument for privileging either those who have LGBT identities or those who pursue their same-sex desires without such identities. Nor is it an argument for withholding solidarity, on the pretext of a sort of 'reverse Orientalism' that would reserve LGBT identities to Europe and the Americas.¹²⁶

124 Achcar 2004, pp. 69–74.

125 Makarewicz 2011, pp. 107–9.

126 Makarewicz 2007, p. 110.

There have in fact been examples of anti-imperial solidarity beyond the Islamic world, in defiance of the strong tendency towards homonationalism among LGBT people in imperialist countries. Several international LGBT organisations, including the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission and the International Muslim group al-Fatiha, joined in 2003 in opposing the US war in Iraq. Yet, in general, radical queers have shown more of an urge to international solidarity than mainstream LGBT NGOs. In the US, it was Queers for Peace and Justice, and the Audre Lorde Project (a group of LGBT people of colour), which created nationwide LGBT anti-war coalitions.¹²⁷

Radical queer solidarity was visible in Israel at the start of the second Palestinian intifada in 2001 when an Israeli queer group marched in Pride with a black banner declaring, 'There Is No Pride in the Occupation'.¹²⁸ Queer solidarity with Palestine took on an international dimension in 2006, when in response to InterPride's decision to hold World Pride in Jerusalem, a New York queer coalition declared, 'It's not "World" Pride without Palestinian and Arab queers, and we refuse to pit our queer celebrations against Palestinians' freedom'.¹²⁹ Ultimately, 22 LGBT organisations boycotted the Jerusalem event. In 2010, LGBT activism succeeded in minimising attendance at a special, Israeli consulate-funded San Francisco Jewish Film Festival series for Israel Pride Month, and in barring a Tel Aviv municipal float from Madrid Pride. The formation of Palestinian Queers for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions in Ramallah in 2010 was a crucial spur towards both international LGBT solidarity and recognition of LGBT people in Palestinian society. Their first global campaign in 2011 led the International Gay and Lesbian Youth Organisation to cancel a gathering planned for Tel Aviv.¹³⁰

A serious base of support for US queer solidarity with the Palestinian struggle was built by a US tour of Palestinian LGBT leaders in 2011, beginning at the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Creating Change conference. The tour was a breakthrough, not only in making Palestinian LGBT people visible, but also in making them the central spokespeople about their own lives and for their own struggle. These events culminated in 2011 when Palestinian BDS leader Omar Barghouti declared in an interview in New York that BDS was 'about building a better society [which] by definition must be inclusive and must recognize people's rights. . . and . . . identity, be it gender, sexual identity [or] any other

127 Puar 2007, pp. 44, 246, n. 25.

128 Schulman 2012, p. 131.

129 Puar 2007, p. 16.

130 Schulman 2012, pp. 15–17, 120–1, 126–7, 176.

form of identity.¹³¹ However, identity is not the core issue. For example, the police rarely know whether the people they harass, arrest or torture identify as gay. The sequence of cause and effect is the reverse, as historians have shown: the common experience of repression can contribute to the development of transgender, gay, lesbian and queer identities.

In the age of neoliberal globalisation, power relations between colonisers (writing or unwitting) and colonised cut across LGBT movements, anti-imperialist movements, and the Marxist left. The fact remains that *all* the victims of oppression today badly need allies in the imperialist countries, who have access to far greater resources. Cultural sensitivity and respect for self-determination are essential. But neither should stand in the way of solidarity with the victims of repression by regimes whose vicious sexual puritanism often goes hand in hand with their subservience to an imperial agenda. Ultimately, queer anti-capitalists in both imperial and dominated countries should join forces to resist empires, and along with them the mirror-image plagues of homonormative arrogance and homophobic repression that the division of the world fosters.

Queering Intimacy and Domesticity

Confronted with the construction of 'normal', nuclear gay families, queer radicals face the challenge of making it possible to organise personal and domestic lives in ways that are freer, more flexible and more open to the wider community. Today, the prevailing family and community structures worldwide are organised in ways that maintain and perpetuate male domination of women, heteronormativity and other inequitable social relations, though sometimes in more subtle forms. As a result, families and communities often exert a conservatising influence in society, in rich countries as well as poor ones, even where poor and working people mobilise in large numbers against the dominant economic policies. Sustained and transformative mobilisation requires changes at the household and community level, so as to change conservatising influences into emancipatory ones. This means that family and community structures dictated by ideology and tradition need to be modified, starting from the dynamics of struggle and self-organisation. Struggle at the elemental household and community level is one of the core dynamics of a queer anti-capitalism.

The feminist dictum that the personal is political means that struggles over power are at work in the smallest social units and in every human relationship.

One benefit of Michel Foucault's influence has been an increased focus on the analysis of power at the micro level. For LGBT people, this means, besides the individual couple, the household and community, where the transformational force of queer dissent is frequently felt. Queers are adopting a range of strategies for intimate relationships and domestic life that provide alternatives to creating homonormative families. There is, of course, no automatic connection between the dynamics at work in an erotic relationship, a friendship or a group of housemates and the broader realm of politics – no automatic translation to issues of reform or revolution. But a feminist and anti-capitalist politics ultimately can and must link these micro-level transformations to the macro level, where they should ultimately be reflected in every site of economic, social and political power.

Queering intimate relationships and domestic units is often the starting point, with changes that can be impelled by a variety of different queer tactics. One tactic – often the only one available to trans people in many countries – is to form or join alternative households and communities of sexual dissidents. In many cases, these sexually dissident communities are economically marginal, confined to the informal sector and sometimes the sex trade. Yet whether among South Asian *hijras* or runaway young people in New York, they are challenges to existing heteronormative families. They can empower people to create and defend homes and communities independent of normatively defined families and communities. As *hijras* join the *hijra* community, they 'simultaneously distance themselves from their former friends and relatives';¹³² paradoxically, this can earn them respect from people still enmeshed in normative families, who see the narrowness and corruption that traditional family loyalty can entail. This perception of *hijras* as less corrupt has been one factor in their electoral appeal: one *hijra* ran for office in Pakistan in 1990, and another was elected to the city council in the northern Indian city of Hissar in 1995.

Alongside alternative queer relationships, friendships, and domestic and community structures, there is also a molecular process – a process that is at work neighbourhood by neighbourhood, family by family, or even individual by individual – of queering existing living units. Even within some traditional families, women who live more or less in a separate women's sphere of domestic labour and household production bond with each other in all sorts of emotional and erotic ways.¹³³ As long as women's intimate relationships with each other take place privately and beyond men's field of vision, they can be entirely

¹³¹ Schulman 2002, pp. 166, 169, 172.

¹³² Nanda 1994, pp. 403–4.

¹³³ Rich 1983, pp. 192–3.